Bill Vallicella, a friend and philosophical sparring partner of two decades, recently discussed another thinker’s argument from design to God.[1] Since my interest lies in biblical rather than “classical” theism, I will not engage with the argument itself or his discussion of it. Instead, I want to examine the presuppositions of philosophical theology general and a thesis of Bill’s in particular.
The presupposition of philosophical theology is that it is licit for a human being to suspend his knowledge of יהוה (Yahweh)—the God of the Bible—in order to explore the limits of philosophical inquiry with respect to God’s existence. From time to time, Bill revisits his thesis that there are no rationally compelling (“knock-down”) arguments for or against any metaphysical position. He did so again in his recent post, providing an opportunity for me to restate my position.
I was reminded of an essay I reposted in 2023, which first appeared on my old site twenty years earlier. In it, I critique “Dogmatic Uncertainty” by the British libertarian classicist and novelist Sean Gabb.[2] Both Gabb and Bill implicitly rely on the classic contrast between δόξα (doxa) and ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)—that is, between “mere” opinion and certain knowledge. Surely Bill, an expert in argumentation, has not ruled out the possibility that we are within our rights to claim ἐπιστήμη regarding God without argumentation? But does the one who one makes such a claim necessarily entail dogmatism in the pejorative sense?
As I said, the enterprise of philosophical theology rests on the (defeasible) presumption of atheism, but the theos of that enterprise is not Yahweh.[3] His sovereignty does not permit creatures to entertain Him as a metaphysical hypothesis, a piece of metaphysical furniture. Yet this is how traditional philosophical theology treats God—an approach fundamentally at odds with the biblical depiction of His infallible self-revelation.
Bill’s thesis—there are no “knock-down” arguments—seems to be an empirical claim. That is, he has not encountered a knock-down argument thus far. But if not empirical, then is it not a dogma, one that no future discovery could overturn? It’s not open to empirical falsification, for no future argument will challenge his thesis.
By contrast, I presuppose that Yahweh makes His existence and power clear to His image-bearing creatures (Romans 1:18-20) and has confirmed that knowledge through linguistic revelation in Scripture (Matthew 4:4). Consequently, there is no need for arguments to His existence from anything else.
Moreover, I propose a testable claim: unless this epistemic state of affairs (this worldview) is presupposed, one cannot make sense of argumentation itself—including arguments that attempt to deduce God’s existence from creation. Human reasoning itself presupposes human creatureliness. Go ahead, make my day, I mean, make sense of it.
Bill, however, seems to considers my presupposition symptomatic of “doxastic insecurity”—an irresistible need for security in one’s beliefs. (I say “seems” because he hasn’t named me.) He writes:
These are people with overpowering doxastic security needs: they have an irresistible need to be secure in their beliefs. They don’t cotton to the idea that many of the deepest problems are insoluble by us. These are people in whom the dogmatic tendency wins out over the inquiring/skeptical tendency. Among these are people who think one can prove the existence of God, or prove the opposite.[4]
Bill, however, does not count himself among such people:
. . . I come around once again to my oft-made meta-philosophical claim that in these metaphysical and theological precincts (and not just here) there are no ‘knock-down’ arguments, no arguments that are rationally compelling (rationally coercive, rationally inescapable, philosophically dispositive, pick your favorite phrase).
Let the dogmatists howl.
Interestingly, the Calvinist philosopher Gordon Clark (1902–1985) openly embraced the label dogmatism for his philosophical position. He observed:
Since the term is so pejorative in connotation, it might seem to have been wise to use the title Fideism. This term has the advantage of being less familiar. Since many people do not know its meaning, it would not so instantly arouse opposition and would therefore have been granted a fairer hearing. On the other hand, Dogmatism is a pointed term that pricks one’s attention.[5]
As Bill’s use of it pricked mine. Clark defined his use term as follows:
The term dogmatism . . . designates that method of procedure which tries to systematize beliefs concerning God, science, immortality, etc., on the basis of information divinely revealed in the sacred writings.[6]
I do not howl in response, but neither am I sure that Bill lumps me in with dogmatists who assert their principles without considering evidence or opposing views. Everything I believe has been contested, yet I ask: is Bill’s thesis itself open to falsification? If not, how does it escape being a dogma in the disreputable sense?
I am a dogmatist in a qualified, perhaps Clarkian (but not Pickwickian) sense. My “dogma” is that all argumentation—whether about metaphilosophy or anything else—rests on a δόγμα (dogma) held with extraordinary, if not invincible, tenacity (though not necessarily with pigheaded obstinacy).
A δόγμα is a non-negotiable conviction, for which one may or may not be willing to provide reasons. The willingness to provide reasons—characteristic of my presuppositionalism—does not make my position any less dogmatic, because it ultimately rests on a dogma. Dogma is inescapable, and so is dogmatism in this sense.
In the Republic and the Meno, Plato contrasts opinion (δόξα) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), arguing that whereas δόξα is changeable, unreliable, and based on appearances, ἐπιστήμη is stable, certain, and rooted in an intellectual grasp of the Forms. Since δοκεῖ (dokei) expresses how things seem, it aligns with subjective perception, whereas ἐπιστήμη involves genuine insight and judgment.[7]
A δόξα (or system of δόξαι) becomes ἐπιστήμη—logically undeniable and incontrovertible—if it grounds intelligible predication and all possible controversy. This belief leads me to presuppose that what we learn about God, man, and the world (the Theos-Anthropos-Kosmos interrelationship) as expressed in Scripture is foundational.
This position entails a critical stance toward philosophy as it is commonly (though not normatively) practiced, even by professing Christians. Philosophical theologians assume, for the sake of argument, that the God they already know to exist doesn’t—and then make a show of attempting to deduce His existence from something else allegedly better known. They, too, are dogmatists.
So am I. I’m just frank about my dogmatism.
Notes
[1] William F. Vallicella, “A Design Argument from the Cognitive Reliability of Our Senses: A Proof of Classical Theism?,” Maverick Philosopher, February 15, 2025. No sooner did I finish writing this post than I saw Bill’s latest, “Notes on R. C. Sproul, Does God Exist?,” Maverick Philosopher, February 22, 2025. I hope to get to this very meaty essay in the near future.
[2] Anthony G. Flood, “Dogmatic Uncertainty,” July 28, 2023. First published in the Free Life: A Journal of Classical Liberal and Libertarian Thought, Issue 47, August 4, 2003 and preserved on the still-extant anthonyflood.com since 2003. It’s a critique of Gabb’s “On Being Uncertain: A Case for Scepticism,” Free Life Commentary, No. 105, 26 May 2003.
[3] See my brief discussion of the so-called “presumption of atheism” in Anthony G. Flood, “How I philosophized when I put philosophy before Christ,” October 21, 2024. (The title is an oblique reference to my Philosophy after Christ: Thinking God’s Thoughts after Him.)
[4] William F. Vallicella, “The Concept of ‘Standoff’ in Philosophy,” Maverick Philosopher: Strictly Philosophical, March 2, 2018.
[5] Gordon H. Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy, P&R Publishing Co., 1973, 7.
[6] Clark, Three Types, 7.
[7] The Greek words δόγμα (dogma) and δόξα (doxa, “opinion,” “glory,”[7] or “reputation”) are related to the verb δοκεῖ (dokei, third person singular: “it seems” or “it appears”) and descend from the Proto-Indo-European root dek- (“to take, accept, perceive”), which in Greek developed into δοκέω (dokéō, “to think, suppose, seem”).